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Abstract 
Under the New Labour government, the neighbourhood emerged prominently as a site 
for policy interventions and as a space for civic activity, resulting in the widespread 
establishment of neighbourhood-level structures for decision-making and service 
delivery. The future existence and utility of these arrangements is now unclear under 
the Coalition government‟s Big Society proposals and fiscal austerity measures. On 
the one hand, sub-local governance structures might be seen as promoting central-to-
local and local-to-community devolution of decision-making. On the other, they might 
be seen as layers of expensive bureaucracy standing in the way of bottom-up 
community action. Arguably the current value and future role of these structures in 
facilitating the Big Society will depend on how they are constituted and with what 
purpose. There are many local variations. In this paper we look at three case studies, in 
England, France and the Netherlands, to learn how different approaches to 
neighbourhood working have facilitated and constrained civic participation and action. 
Drawing on the work of Lowndes and Sullivan (2008) we show how the achievement 
of civic objectives can be hampered in structures set up primarily to achieve social, 
economic and political goals, partly because of (remediable) flaws in civic 
engagement but partly because of the inherent tensions between these objectives in 
relation to issues of spatial scale and the constitution and function of neighbourhood 
structures. The purpose of neighbourhood structures needs to be clearly thought 
through. We also note a distinction between „invited‟ and „popular‟ spaces for citizen 
involvement, the latter being created by citizens themselves. „Invited‟ spaces have 
tended to dominate to date, and the Coalition‟s agenda suggests a fundamental shift to 
„popular‟ spaces. However we conclude that the Big Society will require 
neighbourhood working to be both invited and popular. Citizen participation cannot 
always replace local government – sometimes it requires its support and stimulation. 
The challenge for local authorities is to reconstitute „invited‟ spaces (not to abolish 
them) and at the same time to facilitate „popular‟ spaces for neighbourhood working. 
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1.  Introduction 
We were motivated to write this paper by a shared sense that neighbourhood working 
in the UK currently finds itself at a crossroads.  
 
Under the New Labour government, with its „third way‟ agenda for tackling social 
exclusion, improving public services and remedying the democratic deficit, the 
neighbourhood emerged prominently as a site for policy interventions and as a space 
for civic activity. From the moment of its election in 1997, New Labour adopted a 
sharp focus on the most disadvantaged neighbourhoods, and one in which local 
communities were seen as central to solving problems. Following investigations into 
neighbourhood problems and solutions by the Social Exclusion Unit (1998) and later 
its Policy Action Teams, the government established the National Strategy for 
Neighbourhood Renewal (NSNR; SEU, 2001), a cross-government programme of 
investment and action targeted towards the poorest neighbourhoods. This programme 
pointed explicitly to the need to identify and respond to neighbourhood issues and co-
ordinate services. It established a Neighbourhood Renewal Fund (NRF)
1
, and required 
local authorities eligible for the Fund to set up Local Strategic Partnerships (LSPs), 
bringing together a range of public, private and third sector organisations at the local 
authority level to develop neighbourhood strategies and direct NRF spending. NSNR 
also incorporated a number of specific programmes that specifically required 
neighbourhood-level working. For example, thirty-nine New Deal for Communities 
(NDC) initiatives were run by neighbourhood-based elected boards and developed 
ten-year neighbourhood strategies, delivered by locally-based teams; thirty five 
Neighbourhood Management Pathfinders (NMPs) were concerned with co-ordinating 
services at a neighbourhood level. Lessons learned from these programmes informed a 
wider roll-out. LSPs were extended to areas and the government also encouraged 
(although did not require) larger urban councils to develop multi-agency arrangements 
at a neighbourhood level, similar to ones that had emerged through NSNR. These 
emerging local and neighbourhood working structures provided new opportunities for 
residents and third sector organisations to participate both as strategic partners and as 
delivery organisations, for example through contract-based commissioning. At the 
same time, New Labour also seemed keen to promote greater community involvement 
in decision making and to support community organisations to develop their capacity, 
skills and local projects, providing modest support for community action at the 
neighbourhood level through programmes like the Community Empowerment Fund 
and Community Chest. 
 
Many commentators have criticised the limited impact and inclusiveness of area-based 
initiatives, arguing that they have failed to engage with the structural causes of 
poverty and inequality and they represent little more than „gesture‟ politics (Syrett and 
North, 2008 cited in Durose and Rees forthcoming). Indeed, the government itself 
                                              
1  Succeeded in 2007 by the Working Neighbourhoods Fund (WNF) which has now been 
discontinued. 
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appeared to lose faith in this approach to some extent in its last term, at least as a 
strategy for achieving substantial change in the geography of poverty. Following a 
Cabinet Office review (2005), policy emphasis shifted towards more strategic and 
larger scale approaches (Power 2009, Durose and Rees forthcoming), and the 
neighbourhood lost its prominence at the centre of policy pronouncements. However, 
by this time structures had become well-established at neighbourhood level in many 
places, and in a variety of policy areas. Many local authorities now have a 
neighbourhood-based organisational structure for some types of decision-making and 
for the organisation of some services, typically regeneration, housing, and 
environmental services. These have provided the focus for neighbourhood 
organisation in other services, such as policing, public health and family support 
services, and for multi-agency neighbourhood partnerships. New Labour‟s „Total 
Place‟ initiative, which encouraged public sector organisations to work together to 
map total spend in local areas and to consider how funding streams could be 
combined, was also beginning to stimulate interest in more locally-based, cross-
agency budgets in some places when Labour lost power in 2010.‟Neighbourhood‟ is 
also a space that citizens identify with and feel a sense of belonging and where the 
issues which matter and affect the lives of citizens and communities are in sharpest 
relief (White et. al 2006, Durose and Richardson, 2009). So the importance and value 
of neighbourhood working appears to have become well embedded, although certainly 
its implementation is highly variable from one place to another. 
 
The new Coalition government, elected in 2010, has pinned its colours to the mast of 
„localism‟. As Eric Pickles - Minister for Communities and Local Government – 
noted, „I have 3 very clear priorities: localism… My second priority is localism, and 
my third is… localism‟ (2010). A new Localism Bill was published in December 2010 
promising “a radical shift of power from the central state to local communities” (HM 
Government 2010, p2), thus articulating the Conservative desire for a „Big Society‟ 
with smaller government and more community involvement in social action and 
public service delivery, and the Liberal Democrat desire for decentralisation and 
“community politics”. The Big Society agenda wraps up public sector reform (asking 
citizens to think about „what the state can do for you‟), community empowerment 
(„what we can do for ourselves‟) and philanthropic action („what we can do for 
others‟). The government has pledged itself to reduced bureaucracy, greater 
transparency, more freedoms for local authorities, greater diversity of service 
provision as well as a range of measures to encourage volunteering and involvement 
in social action and to train a new generation of community organisers and support the 
creation of neighbourhood groups across the UK. In addition, it is promising to 
support the creation and expansion of mutuals, co-operatives, charities and social 
enterprises and enable these groups to have much greater involvement in the running 
of public services. A „Big Society Bank‟ has been set up to provide new finance for 
neighbourhood groups, charities, social enterprises and other non-governmental 
bodies. 
 
Ostensibly the neighbourhood is very prominent in this agenda. Yet it is not obvious 
what specific role will be played by neighbourhood structures. The Coalition has 
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given strong endorsement to the principles of “double” devolution, from central 
government to local authorities and from local authorities to communities and 
individuals. However it is unclear at this stage what will be devolved to whom: 
whether „communities‟ are effectively seen as operating at the local authority level 
(local communities as opposed to central government) or at the neighbourhood or 
locality level (local communities rather than local authorities). Under the former 
model, neighbourhood structures for local authority services could be seen as an 
essential part of the devolution of services; under the latter they could be seen as a 
layer of official bureaucracy obstructing decision-making and service delivery by 
groups of interested citizens. One implication of the freeing up of local authorities 
from central government control is that we are highly unlikely to see any specific 
guidance or prescription from central government on how decisions should be made or 
services run at neighbourhood level, leading to a variety of local arrangements.  
 
At the same time, widespread public spending cuts may well threaten some 
neighbourhood level services and the management structures that support these 
services, as well as voluntary and community involvement. Additional funding 
programmes for neighbourhood regeneration akin to those announced in 1997, which 
were instrumental in giving rise to neighbourhood structures, seem highly unlikely in 
an environment of doing „more with less‟. In fact, the focus on neighbourhood 
regeneration within the Department of Communities and Local Government seems to 
have disappeared in a new organisational structure that promotes the Big Society 
everywhere, rather than concentrating efforts on disadvantaged neighbourhoods. In 
combination the „radical localist austerity‟ engendered by the recent Comprehensive 
Spending Review and the Coalition‟s apparent lack of solutions to the problems of the 
poorest neighbourhoods may cause some commentators to re-think their critical 
analyses of New Labour‟s targeted funded interventions at the neighbourhood level 
(Durose and Rees, forthcoming). In short, we have moved from a situation in which 
neighbourhood working was becoming widely established to one in which it appears 
supported in principle, but potentially vulnerable in practice. It is not clear at this stage 
what role, if any will be played by existing neighbourhood structures, nor what new 
structures may be necessary to deliver the Big Society agenda.  
 
In this context, this paper is partly designed both to inform emerging policy at national 
level, and partly to help local authority policy-makers to anticipate and make sense of 
likely changes and their implications, and to evaluate the fit between existing 
structures and new policy objectives. We start from the position that neither 
commitment to engaging people in local problem solving nor devolving the powers to 
do this are new ideas in the UK or elsewhere in Europe. As such, there is plenty to be 
learned from existing examples. We therefore take an empirical and comparative 
approach, examining different models of neighbourhood working from across Europe 
with different approaches to ideas of „localism‟ and civic participation. In particular, 
we draw on three city case studies: Liverpool, England, which set up five 
Neighbourhood Management Areas across the city in 2007; Roubaix, France, which 
has had five Neighbourhood Councils (underpinned by Neighbourhood Committees) 
since 2003; and Rotterdam in the Netherlands, with its fourteen City-District 
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Councils. We review these different approaches against a typology of rationales for 
neighbourhood working set out by Lowndes and Sullivan (2008; see also Durose and 
Richardson, 2009) in order to identify why and how different models contribute 
differently to the achievement of civic objectives. From this we draw conclusions 
about what existing neighbourhood structures are likely to contribute to Big Society 
objectives and how they might need to be developed, whilst also highlighting the risks 
to equitable participation, local democracy, and effective service delivery that may 
arise either from unsuitable forms of neighbourhood or from their absence, 
particularly in disadvantaged urban areas.  
 
2.  The Many Purposes of Neighbourhood Working 
One of the difficulties in working out what role neighbourhood working can play is 
that there is no one clear understanding of what neighbourhood working is, what it 
does and over what scale it operates. Lowndes and Sullivan (2008, p62) define a 
neighbourhood approach as a set of “arrangements for collective decision making 
and/or service delivery at the sub-local level.” This implies the transfer of political 
and/or managerial authority (note that it may be one or both) from „higher‟ to „lower‟ 
level actors. However, as they point out “who gains power and over what depends 
upon the purpose and design of devolution”. (Lowndes and Sullivan 2008,p62). White 
et al. (2006, p12) imply a stronger emphasis on decision making than delivery when 
they describe neighbourhood working as:  
the practices and arrangements at a neighbourhood level that: provide 
leadership, develop shared values and a shared vision, for an area; exert 
influence over decisions that affect an area take decisions about an area; 
monitor both the execution and the impact of decisions; and recognise 
the development of local institutions and processes that are responsible 
for making decisions and allocating resources locally..  
 
Both these sets of authors, and others (for example Power 2004, Young Foundation 
2005, Richardson, 2008) point to difficulties in defining the spatial scale of a 
neighbourhood. Lowndes and Sullivan (2008, p62) suggest that “‘neighbourhood’ is 
not an objective category: consequently, the idea of the ‘sub-local’ is a relative 
concept, referring to an area smaller than the local authority boundary, though such 
areas may contain 1,000 residents or 10,000” while White et al. (2006) say that the 
definition of a neighbourhood is relatively broad, will vary according to locality, and 
should be locally defined to offer a viable neighbourhood in terms of ensuring 
sustainable governance arrangements.  
 
Arguably, the most appropriate size, scale and organisational set up for 
neighbourhood working should be determined by its aims and purposes. What is 
neighbourhood working trying to achieve? Lowndes and Sullivan (2008), examining 
the „turn to neighbourhood‟ under New Labour, identified four different rationales for 
neighbourhood working, civic; economic; political; and social, with concomitant 
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„ideal‟ institutional forms and citizen roles (Table 1). The civic rationale emphasises 
community action and empowerment (“what we can do for ourselves”); the economic 
is concerned with more efficient service delivery through shared services and effective 
problem identification; the political is concerned with transparency, accessibility and 
accountability, giving citizens more say over services; and the social with making sure 
that services are designed around citizens‟ needs, rather than bureaucratic needs. 
Revisiting Lowndes and Sullivan‟s work at this political moment is particularly 
illuminating. Clearly all these rationales were evident not only within New Labour 
policy but within the pronouncements of the new government, and in Table 1 we have 
extended Lowndes and Sullivan‟s analysis to show the links to Coalition policy. 
 
Of course, when articulating the aims of their work, many practitioners make a case 
for all four rationales, arguing that they are complementary. In theory, this is an easy 
argument to construct: being closer to citizens (civic rationale) enhances their 
empowerment and makes them more likely to participate in democratic processes 
(political rationale), as well as providing intelligence with which to re-design holistic 
citizen-centred services (social rationale). A different relationship with citizens can 
contribute to behaviour change which leads to reduced demand for services (economic 
rationale) as citizens generate more self-help (civic rationale). Changed behaviour on 
the part of citizen is mirrored by fundamental organisational and cultural 
transformation by public sector institutions, putting the citizen or user at the heart of 
services and working across agencies (social rationale). Re-designed services with 
more intelligent and less demanding consumers are then more effective and therefore 
efficient (economic rationale). Local politicians (political rationale) are placed firmly 
in the lead of these significant shifts in relationships between citizen and state. 
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Table 1: A Typology of Neighbourhood Working 
Rationale Civic Economic Political Social 
Opportunities 
for direct citizen 
participation and 
community 
action 
Focus on 
efficiency and 
effectiveness 
gains in local 
service delivery; 
tax/spend 
bargain 
Improvements 
in accessibility, 
accountability 
and 
responsiveness 
of decision 
making. 
Enhanced role 
and greater 
control and 
leadership for 
local politicians  
Holistic and 
citizen centred 
approach to 
delivering 
services; 
designing 
services around 
citizen 
Comparable 
typology
2
 
Self-reliance: 
DIY community 
action 
More market: 
business-led 
approach 
n/a More state: 
strengthen 
welfare and 
reduce 
inequality 
Form of 
democracy 
Participatory 
democracy 
Market 
democracy 
Representative 
democracy 
Stakeholder 
democracy 
Institutional 
design  
Neighbourhood 
empowerment 
Neighbourhood 
management 
Neighbourhood 
working 
Neighbourhood 
partnerships 
Citizen role Citizen: voice, 
co-production 
Consumer: 
choice, reducing 
own demands 
on consumption 
Elector: vote Partner: loyalty, 
problem 
solving, 
„intelligent user‟  
Link to 
Coalition policy 
„Big Society‟ in 
the form of 
volunteering, 
community 
organisers, and 
service 
ownership and 
delivery 
Comprehensive 
Spending 
Review, 
Community 
Budget pilots, 
Local delivery 
as a way to cut 
out the waste of 
large 
bureaucracies 
 
Focus on 
leadership by 
local politicians  
Localism, 
Transparency, 
„upwards 
accountability‟, 
elected police 
commissioners 
Community 
Budget pilots 
Local people 
being able to get 
the services they 
need rather than 
“one size fits 
all” 
 
Note: Adapted from Lowndes and Sullivan (2008) and Durose and Richardson (2009). 
 
 
  
                                              
2  Syrett and North (2008). 
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The New Labour administration (White et al, 2006) rejected any dichotomy between 
service improvement (social and economic rationales) and community involvement 
(civic rationale) as false, arguing that most neighbourhood partnerships are concerned 
with both in practice. Policy thinking by the Coalition also seems to go along these 
lines. The Localism Bill (HM Government, 2010) announces six intertwined actions 
to move from Big Government to the Big Society. The first two focus on civic 
rationales: „empowering communities to do things their way‟ and „lifting the burden 
of bureaucracy‟ so that they can. Others focus on service efficiency (economic 
rationale) and service design (social rationale). The government argues that „the 
supply of services needs to be diversified‟ because large monopolies cannot deliver 
efficient services nor ones which are sufficiently locally tailored However, it sees 
citizen involvement in running these services (civic rationale) as a key way of 
diversifying services – these are seen as entirely compatible objectives. The remaining 
three principles -‟increase local control of public finance‟, „open up government to 
public scrutiny‟ and „strengthen accountability to local people‟ – appear to rest on a 
political rationale, although it is also evident that devolving financial control is 
intended to support citizen involvement (civic) and enable citizens to design services 
around their needs (social), and that more accountable governmental structures should 
encourage participation (civic) and lead to better (social) and more efficient 
(economic) services.  
 
However, there are also many reasons to suspect that achieving these mutually 
complementary aims is extremely challenging, and requires very different operational 
and governance structures and scales of operation. The prosaic truth is that the 
pressures of delivering public services in complex situations, like neighbourhoods, 
often forces those engaged in it to narrow their focus on particular sets of goals, at the 
expense of other functions. The political realities which underlie this work may also 
work against an ideal world situation of all four rationales being equally present. 
Political ideologies favour some approaches over others. The strength of political 
control in local public administration may determine how far a councillor-led political 
rationale or an officer-led social rationale is dominant. „Old‟ models of paternalistic 
mono-government left little space for the citizen, but even new forms of network 
governance have been dominated by a technocratic agenda rather than citizen 
perspectives (Durose, Greasley and Richardson, 2009). 
 
To explore how these tensions play out in practice, we now turn to some real 
examples of existing neighbourhood structures, to see how well they have balanced 
the four rationales in practice, and why. 
 
3.  Case Studies 
The paper principally draws on a study of neighbourhood working in three European 
cities: Liverpool, Roubaix, and Rotterdam, which was undertaken by research teams 
within ECORYS during 2009. The study originated in ECORYS‟ interest in processes 
of urban regeneration, and was designed to explore how neighbourhood structures 
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were designed and how they worked in disadvantaged urban areas in different 
countries. England, France and the Netherlands were included in the study because in 
all three cases central governments have targeted specific neighbourhoods with urban 
regeneration policies, giving rise to neighbourhood structures, and also provided 
additional resources to encourage community empowerment. We have already 
described recent policy in England. In France comparable approaches have included 
designation of 751 Unstable Urban Areas (the ZUS) in 1996, fifty Major Urban 
Projects (GPVs), and more recently the development of Contracts for Social Cohesion 
(CUCS), covering 2,200 neighbourhoods, and the Residents‟ Participation Fund, 
through which small budgets of €5,000 are allocated to community associations via a 
straightforward and accessible application process. The Netherlands has a targeted 
urban regeneration programme (including the Big Cities Policy, Integrated Budgets 
for Urban Renewal and most recently the‟40 Neighbourhoods Programme)‟ which 
also includes a Residents‟ Budget scheme.  
 
In each country, one city was chosen, with the aim of including cities which were 
similar in their social and economic characteristics, including histories of industrial 
decline and regeneration and concentrations of poverty, so that the implementation of 
different policy approaches could be examined across similar settings (see Appendix 1 
for further details). Within each city one neighbourhood was selected for detailed 
examination (again based upon a combination of indices of deprivation and also the 
presence of active (and often overlapping) neighbourhood interventions. The selected 
neighbourhoods are shown in Table 2. 
 
Table 2: Case studies  
Country City Neighbourhood 
England Liverpool Alt Valley 
France Roubaix Quartier Ouest 
Netherlands Rotterdam Delfshaven 
 
In each case, desk research was conducted including a review of academic literature 
and other national country studies, city and neighbourhood strategies and action plans, 
local monitoring data, and national and local statistics. Researchers in each country 
also conducted up to twenty semi-structured interviews with stakeholders involved in 
neighbourhood working, based around a common topic guide covering the extent, 
nature and contributions of neighbourhood working, including its key strengths and 
weaknesses as a concept. These included regional and city government officers, 
neighbourhood management officers and representatives, and public, private and 
voluntary sector delivery organisations active in each neighbourhood, for example 
housing associations and the police. Contacts were identified initially via city 
governments, and then snowball techniques, to ensure a broad coverage across 
different sectors of public policy (employment, environment etc). The resources 
available to the project did not permit systematic engagement with residents in any 
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way, although representatives of community-led organisations such as development 
trusts were interviewed.  
The research findings were written up as an internal report by ECORYS researchers 
and the case study material has subsequently been re-analysed for this paper by the 
current team of authors. At some points in the paper, we also draw case study 
evidence from a further Ecorys study the Local Research Project (LRP) for the 
national evaluation of the National Strategy for Neighbourhood Renewal in England 
(Communities and Local Government (CLG), 2010a
3
). The LRP‟s case studies 
covered eighteen deprived neighbourhoods in England in receipt of the 
Neighbourhood Renewal Fund (NRF), and three deprived neighbourhoods without 
NRF. The research utilised a combination of statistical analysis and primary 
qualitative research, incorporating over seven hundred interviews with regional and 
local stakeholders and thirty-six resident focus groups.  
 
The value of the case study approach is that it enables an in-depth understanding of 
the issues and processes that arise in particular contexts, as seen through the eyes of 
participants with different perspectives. Using multiple cases not only adds more 
observations but enables us to identify similarities and differences in process and 
outcome when key contextual variables differ – in this case, national political and 
institutional frameworks, histories and cultures.  
 
In particular, a key difference between England and the other countries in this study is 
that in both other countries, neighbourhood governance arrangements have been 
mandated by law, rather than merely being encouraged by central government. 
France‟s Loi Vaillant of 2003 required local government to designate and establish 
Neighbourhood Councils in all cities with a population of over 80,000, to provide 
residents with a voice in local policy making and a resident feedback mechanism for 
city government. In the Netherlands, Amsterdam and Rotterdam are unique in having 
an additional tier of sub-city government in the form of City-District Councils (each 
covering around 40-70,000 residents), which are required by national law and which 
hold their own elections and have statutory responsibilities for devolved service 
delivery (predominantly social and housing policy), supported by a sizeable 
bureaucracy. In England, local authorities can determine their own local substructures, 
or not.  
 
Central-local relationships also differ. Although in all three case study countries, 
national government remains a key source of finance for local government, the nature 
of the relationship with local government differs greatly. In England, local 
government has been the subject of increasing scrutiny and control by central 
government since the 1980s. Although there have been moves recently to expand the 
role and responsibilities of local authorities, and greatly reduce central regulation and 
inspection, local priorities therefore remain heavily driven by centrally determined 
                                              
3  Research was undertaken by ECORYS, formerly ECOTEC Research and Consulting, 
between 2006 and 2008 (ECOTEC, 2009; CLG, 2010a). The LRP aimed to assess the impact 
and outcomes of the National Strategy for Neighbourhood Renewal (NSNR) through in-depth 
case study research, and supported the overall national evaluation (CLG, 2010b). 
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political agendas and funding regimes. In France, there is much greater emphasis on 
the role of local government and on the state in general, as a „guardian of the public 
interest‟. In contrast to England, the trend in France over recent years has been for 
greater political decentralisation. The status of the state in French society as a 
guardian of the general interest, and of the communes as the most democratic level of 
government, leads to a high level of involvement of locally elected members, in 
contrast to the English system (Smith, Lepine and Taylor, 2007). The Dutch model is 
similarly based on the principle of municipal autonomy; over the past few decades, the 
competencies of the national government have been increasingly decentralised to 
lower tiers of government following the period of post-war reconstruction, mirroring 
the trends seen in France. Local governments are free to decide on how to spend their 
municipal funds, derived from national tax revenues. The most influential layer of 
governance in relation to urban renewal is the city council (as well as district councils 
in Amsterdam and Rotterdam), which execute their policies (almost) independently 
from the national government.  
 
In other words, what we attempt to do via these case studies is to explore 
neighbourhood working at ground level in different settings, covering questions like:  
 What different structures have evolved and why?  
 What rationales have given rise to different structures?  
 How well have the arrangements delivered on the different objectives for 
neighbourhood working? 
 Are the objectives compatible in practice? 
 What, in practice, makes it more or less likely that objectives will be achieved? 
 Why are things possible in some settings but not others? In particular, how have 
the different policy approaches and central-local relations in different countries led 
to different outcomes? 
Considering these questions leads us to be able to reflect on the ways in which 
existing and new neighbourhood structures might support the UK government‟s new 
policy objectives.  
 
An important point to note is that, because of the origins of the study, all the areas are 
relatively disadvantaged. In the context of the Big Society agenda, an important 
question is whether different structures are a) necessary and b) possible in more socio-
economically advantaged areas. This is a question that we cannot examine directly 
using our empirical data. 
 
4.  Neighbourhood Working and its Rationales in the Case Study Cities 
and Neighbourhoods 
Liverpool (Alt Valley) 
Liverpool established its neighbourhood management programme in 2007, as a local 
response to both NSNR (and co-ordination with other regeneration programmes such 
as Objective 1 European Regional Development Funding) and New Labour‟s political 
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devolution agenda. At the time of our research, the city was divided into five 
Neighbourhood Management Areas (NMAs) each covering six electoral wards and 
90-100,000 residents, and having a team of around ten staff. We focused particularly 
on one NMA, Alt Valley.  
 
Across the city, the main decision making bodies in the NMAs were District 
Committees, which met quarterly and included senior public sector managers and 
elected Councillors. Their primary responsibilities included developing 
neighbourhood plans and improving neighbourhood service delivery, as well as 
allocating a budget of £100,000-200,000 to fund additional local projects. Councillors 
also chaired Neighbourhood Partnership Working Groups (NPWGs), made up of paid 
workers from agencies delivering public services and local authority officers, to 
develop and monitor actions within their respective themes. Below these, „Task and 
Finish‟ groups were convened to carry out particular projects.  
 
Interviews and documentary evidence suggest that social rationale was a particularly 
strong driving force behind Liverpool‟s approach. NMAs aimed to deliver services at 
a local level that matched each area‟s needs, covering housing, health, jobs, skills and 
training, safety and including through joint work with other local authorities and 
government agencies to tackle wider social problems, and through community 
involvement
4
. The large scale of the neighbourhood management areas, much larger 
than those conceived by Lowndes and Sullivan (2008), was therefore designed to 
match an appropriate scale for service delivery. Liverpool City Council officers 
reported that Neighbourhood Management has since provided a framework for the 
devolution of some local authority services including sport, recreation and 
environmental services to the neighbourhood level, and for joint working around other 
services such as public health and employment. In Alt Valley, this joint working (and 
the additional funding stream to support it) had enabled the development of small-
scale community safety and environmental projects (including a witness and victim 
support programme and community garden), as detailed in the area‟s Neighbourhood 
Agreement for 2007-10. The Neighbourhood Manager also reported that it has 
enabled linkage between neighbourhood residents and city wide programmes (for 
example through facilitating the involvement of residents in a city-wide regeneration 
agency‟s local housing project, and the development of a „health year‟ for residents). 
To a certain extent, political and economic rationales were also evident. Local 
councillors were given a prominent role in leading District Committees and working 
groups, and interviewees from the neighbourhood management team argued that costs 
saving could be made in service delivery by joint working between agencies, although 
in practice it was hard to evidence this.  
 
Civic engagement was undoubtedly one objective of neighbourhood management in 
Liverpool. However it was less prominent than other rationales. Residents were 
engaged through three key mechanisms: regular consultation events, known as „Your 
Community Matters‟, with a strong input from local Councillors around the design of 
                                              
4  Liverpool City Council briefing note, 21 November 2008  
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these events; customer research through household surveys, use of newsletters and 
directly through individual service providers; and via residents‟ elected 
representatives tasked with feeding their constituents‟ concerns up to the NPWGs. 
This was primarily a representative democracy model, serving the political rationale, 
with an emphasis on consultation to ensure that services were designed around 
community needs (a reflection of the social rationale). According to interviewees, 
these arrangements were also partly a result of the recent history of community 
involvement in Liverpool, which had been significantly influenced by the availability 
of European „Objective 1‟ funding. A condition of this funding was the establishment 
of dedicated area-based partnerships with guaranteed seats (and votes) for community 
representatives. Some service providers remarked that some of the stakeholders 
involved in the partnerships had been overtly political and obstructive and questioned 
how representative they were of wider community views. They doubted that residents 
were able to contribute meaningfully to debate at a strategic level and according to 
some interviewees it was to avoid these same difficulties that the City Council had 
moved to a politician-led and consultative model for Neighbourhood Management. 
Community representatives in the research however, including a local development 
trust, felt somewhat disempowered by this shift in models of engagement. 
 
Interestingly, since our research took place, there has been a shift of policy and 
approach. In May 2010, Liverpool had a shift in political control, and has also been 
working on how to make significant budget savings. Already, some services have 
been re-centralised including environmental maintenance, and the Neighbourhood 
Management Teams have been reduced in size. Looking ahead, it seems likely that 
Liverpool‟s Neighbourhood Management will move towards more of an enabling role, 
focusing on co-ordination rather than direct service delivery, with the District 
Committees or „mini LSPs‟ supported by existing service staff working together at the 
neighbourhood level, rather than dedicated workers. Buy-in at the executive director 
level is currently secured through the nomination of „Devolution Champions‟. Whilst 
a reflection of wider reductions in public sector budgets, this may also be in 
recognition of the limited progress made on the economic rationale for neighbourhood 
governance (or at least on evidencing real value for money benefits).  
 
Roubaix (Neighbourhood West) 
Roubaix‟s structure was one of Neighbourhood Councils (prescribed by statute as 
described above). According to the city government, these were on a much smaller 
scale than Liverpool‟s NMAs, serving approximately 20,000 residents each. The 
Neighbourhood Councils were led by the Neighbourhood Mayor, an existing elected 
politician. They met bi-monthly and consisted of 80 members, of whom half were 
residents. As in Liverpool, they were supported by 10-15 permanent staff, including, 
in Neighbourhood West‟s case, a Director, responsible for running the office; the 
neighbourhood Project Manager who supervised the implementation of the „Politique 
de la Ville‟5 projects in the neighbourhood and coordinated the different actors 
                                              
5  The French neighbourhood renewal programme commonly named „Politique de la Ville‟ was 
launched in the late 1970s. 
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involved; and the „Cadre de Vie‟ Technician (community life technician) who dealt 
with daily contact with residents, coordinates local services (e.g. parking, cleanliness), 
and supported partnership initiatives. The latter officer also managed an annual budget 
of Euro 100,000 to spend on micro-urban renewal projects, in partnership with the 
local authority. 
 
With their focus on engaging residents and officers in democratic debate (particularly 
around strategy and local services), but without investing significant decision making 
power amongst the residents themselves, the approach and institutional design of 
Roubaix‟s structure reflects most closely the political rationale for neighbourhood 
working within the Lowndes and Sullivan typology. According to one elected 
representative, it offered a way to “renew the relation between the residents and the 
elected representatives”. Indeed the political workings of the Neighbourhood Council 
have been an issue of active debate.  
 
The city council reported that changes had to be made to the Neighbourhood Councils 
in 2008 following accusations of demagogic behaviour by Neighbourhood Mayors, an 
over-representation of some groups, and the subsequent loss of other members. It was 
argued that Neighbourhood Mayors had not properly fulfilled their functions and 
instead acted as isolated actors, appropriating issues for their own benefit instead of 
acting in the general interest. Quotas were introduced to help diversify membership, 
and include professionals and representative organisations alongside residents.  
 
Roubaix‟s neighbourhood management arrangements were ostensibly stronger than 
Liverpool‟s in terms of civic involvement both because of the smaller scale of the 
neighbourhoods and because pre-existing structures for resident empowerment were 
maintained under new arrangements. Roubaix also had a system of Neighbourhood 
Committees which pre-dated Neighbourhood Councils, having been created through a 
popular residents‟ movement in the 1970s. They had 15-20 permanent members, were 
represented on the Neighbourhood Councils, and were each supported by one full-
time employee, who provides advice and guidance to local residents (this reported to 
have helped make local services more accessible). Neighbourhood Councils were 
involved in the management of the Residents‟ Participation Fund, allocated by the 
region and the city to fund community involvement and cohesion building projects at 
the neighbourhood level, and then “managed by, with and for residents”.  
 
There has been some progress on addressing neighbourhood social issues e.g. through 
the renovation of a playground, traffic management and pedestrianisation studies, and 
most notably through conducting an environmental diagnostic, which influenced other 
Neighbourhood Committees and the city council to tender in cooperation with 
neighbouring cities for the creation of a green corridor (the „Ecologic Corridor‟, worth 
more than a million Euros). However, it was also felt by national government agencies 
that such examples of significant influence were rare: the Residents‟ Participation 
Fund was said to mainly fund “ephemeral and not very sustainable projects”. A lack 
of substantial economic rationale is illustrated by the fact that Neighbourhood 
Councils and Committees are primarily concerned with resident engagement, debate 
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and proposals for additional services, as opposed to substantive service remodelling or 
supporting efficiencies within existing services: 
“Decisions are taken between the Government and the city council… Neighbourhood 
Councils are there for exchange and the organisation of local events” (housing 
agency manager).  
 
Rotterdam (Delfshaven), 
Rotterdam had the most extensive devolution of the three cities at the time of the 
research. The city was divided into four City-Districts (including Delfshaven), each 
covering a number of sub-neighbourhoods and totalling around 70,000 residents. In 
contrast to the other case studies, the City-Districts in Rotterdam had a substantial 
delegated budget (circa Euro 30 million per annum), responsibility for management of 
national regeneration budgets for their districts (including 40 Neighbourhoods 
Funding) and officer complements of around 300 staff for each City District. District 
policy programmes and budgets were negotiated with the city government, to reflect 
national and city policies and agreed output measures. In this sense, Rotterdam‟s City-
District Councils would appear to most closely align with the economic rationale for 
neighbourhood working, with their focus on ensuring more efficient and effective 
service delivery. City-District goals were delivered through direct service delivery, 
commissioning of services, and partnership agreements reached through consensus on 
the basis of reciprocity and mutual dependence.  
 
The Dutch example was reported by local and national urban officials to have been 
particularly successful in facilitating more localised delivery of a range of social, 
community safety, and housing services, including in Delfshaven developing „public 
space behaviour rules‟, commissioning local employment and youth services, bringing 
local housing associations together to develop a neighbourhood action plan, 
renovating derelict homes in partnership with residents, and in general terms ensuring 
that national regeneration programmes were channelled towards tackling 
neighbourhood priorities. Contractors and other delivery partners could be engaged 
and monitored at a more local level. Low income neighbourhoods such as Delfshaven 
have experienced significant increases in neighbourhood satisfaction and safety over 
the period of intervention. Services more efficiently dealt with at a higher level were 
managed by Rotterdam City Council. 
 
Delfshaven City-District Council could also be seen to be offering an opportunity to 
strengthen democratic accountability, and hence also aligns with the political 
rationale. The city district or Deelgemeenten (sub-municipalities) were the lowest 
administrative level in the municipality and were democratically elected, with policy 
implemented by the district-mayor (voorzitter) and the district-aldermen. However, 
the independence of the City District Council was limited, as they needed to formalize 
an official management agreement (bestuursakkoord) with the city council. The city 
district acted a local extension of the government of the municipality of Rotterdam, 
with responsibility for social cohesion, public space, local government services and 
similar issues. 
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Residents had no formal role in Delfshaven City-District decision-making, although 
they were involved indirectly as voters and directly through consultation on specific 
developments and issues (whether through resident participation platforms organised 
by the City-District government or through day to day contact with housing 
corporation employees and neighbourhood police officers). City-District Councils in 
Rotterdam had also used their allocation of the Neighbourhood and Resident Budgets 
to develop more innovative public participation through „Delfshaven Duiten‟. Every 
resident in the neighbourhood was given a token representing a small monetary value, 
five times a year, and encouraged to group together with other residents in order to 
commission additional projects and activities to benefit the neighbourhood from this 
relatively modest additional fund. However, there was no direct participation in 
decisions about other more significant investment or policy.  
 
One successful civic activity in Rotterdam was an initiative known as Opzoomeren. 
This was initiated by local residents in Rotterdam West to enliven their 
neighbourhood to improve safety, amenity, and „gezelligheid‟ (cosiness) in the 
neighbourhood by organising street activities, such as small street festivals, 
neighbourhood clean-ups and flower planting. The initiative was later co-opted by the 
municipality which opened an Opzoomer-office and subsidizes various activities. At 
the time of the research, the programme was city-wide, with paid neighbourhood co-
ordinators, and was funded by the city government; 18 per cent of all Rotterdam 
citizens participated in Opzoomeren activities.  
 
Summary  
Table 3 summarises key elements of neighbourhood working in the three case study 
cities in relation to the typology presented in Table 1.  
 
This overview suggests that in each case, neighbourhood structures were driven by a 
number of different rationales – there was no case where only one objective 
dominated. However, the emphasis was different in each case, with more emphasis on 
the social rationale in Liverpool, political in Roubaix and economic in Rotterdam.  
 
Economic and social rationales were closely related, since economies in service 
delivery from joint working and partnership working to fit services more closely to 
residents‟ needs were often seen as two sides of the same coin. Table 4 produces a 
very simple summary, with the number of crosses indicating the strength of the 
rationale in each case.  
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Table 3: Case Studies considered in relation to the Neighbourhood Rationales 
 Alt Valley, Liverpool, England Neighbourhood West, Roubaix, 
France 
Delfshaven, Rotterdam, Netherlands 
 
Civic 
● Your Community Matters consultation  
● Project specific resident involvement (e.g. 
community gardens)  
● Neighbourhood Councils – 50% 
individuals 
● Neighbourhood committees  
● Resident Participation Fund  
● Neighbourhood and resident budgets 
● Delfshaven Duiten –‟PB‟ originated 
from City-District –‟tokens‟ 
● Opzoomeren – created by residents  
 
Economic 
● Service providers exchange data and avoid 
duplication of effort  
● Commissioned Alt Valley Community Trust to 
deliver environmental services 
● Neighbourhood Councils co-
ordinate services in neighbourhood  
● Neighbourhood Committee service 
desks 
● City-Districts – €30 million/annum (% 
of city budget), more localised service 
delivery/policy  
● Service commissioning (e.g. local job 
scheme)  
● Bilateral agreements with partners, no 
sanctions for non-compliance  
 
Political 
● District committees – 90,000 population 
covering six Wards, defined by city council, ward 
councillors 
● Cllrs chair NPWGs 
● Neighbourhood Area Agreements link to Local 
authority targets 
● Neighbourhood councils, led by 
Neighbourhood Mayors (elected 
members of city council) 
● City-Districts –tier of local 
government, all councillors directly 
elected 
 
Social 
●Budget of £100-200,000/annum 
● Neighbourhood Partnership Working Groups 
● Task and Finish groups 
● Witness protection scheme, Health Year, 
community gardens, sports, youth diversion ● 
Close links with neighbourhood jobs employment 
and training programmes  
● Micro-urban renewal projects (e.g. 
playground renovations) 
● Traffic management projects e.g. 
pedestrianisation 
● Urban green space projects 
● Strong overlap with economic 
● Funnelling of national regeneration 
budgets to meet local needs 
● Innovative homesteading and youth 
training and employment projects  
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Table 4: Rationales for Neighbourhood Working - Summary 
 
Case studies  
Alt Valley, 
Liverpool, 
England 
Neighbourhood 
West, Roubaix, 
France 
Delfshaven, 
Rotterdam, 
Netherlands 
 
Civic 
 
X 
 
X 
 
X 
 
Economic 
 
X 
 
X 
 
XXX 
 
Political 
 
 
XX 
 
XXX 
 
XX 
 
Social 
 
XXX 
 
XX 
 
XX 
 
Dominant rationale 
 
Social 
 
Political 
 
Economic 
 
This is in an oversimplified presentation, but we use it to make a simple point: 
although all the case studies of neighbourhood working included mechanisms for civic 
participation and involvement, this was not the strongest rationale for neighbourhood 
working in any of the cases. Thus citizen participation was taking place in the context 
of structures that were also serving other ends: creating stronger and more accountable 
local political structures, enabling co-ordination of service delivery, aligning 
objectives and spending at local authority and neighbourhood levels, and making 
efficiency savings. Clearly this could also be the case more widely in the current UK 
context, if civic activism for the Big Society is promoted within structures that already 
exist for neighbourhood working, set up primarily with other goals in mind. We 
therefore turn to look more closely at the „civic‟ elements of the case studies: how did 
the different structures perform in relation to their civic rationales; were they effective 
(or not) in engaging and activating citizens; what were the tensions and difficulties 
between the civic and other objectives?  
 
The evidence from these case studies suggests that there were weaknesses in civic 
engagement and empowerment in all the selected neighbourhoods. Stakeholders 
across the case studies broadly felt that residents had played a largely consultative role 
within neighbourhood working structures, as opposed to direct participation in 
decision making, budgeting or community action, with community involvement 
usually heavily state-directed and circumscribed. Whilst there is an important role for 
consultation within the spectrum of civic engagement, this could be perceived as 
reactive, and unlikely to deliver the „Big Society‟. Some stakeholders talked about 
„directed consultation‟, which was „tokenistic‟ and was felt to preclude genuine 
community participation and empowerment.  
18 
 
Tensions were evident for example between Roubaix‟s Neighbourhood Committees 
and the more recently established Neighbourhood Councils, with one Committee in 
Neighbourhood West of the opinion that the Council did not always take their 
suggestions and proposed projects into consideration (the example of a proposal for an 
intermediate labour market project, and tackling unemployment more generally, was 
cited). However this issue itself was contested within the community and perspectives 
tended to differ by Neighbourhood Committee. Other community associations spoke 
highly of the engagement role of the Neighbourhood Councils: 
“In the case of the Lignons projects for example, residents intervened 
during one of the meetings, the architect listened to their questions and 
remarks and the whole project got reversed. He became interested in the 
people” (President of the association „Théâtre tout Azimut‟).   
 
To a certain extent, problems and tensions were a matter of gaps in community 
engagement practice that could easily be remedied and were not systemic. The core 
methods of resident engagement were on the whole conservative, with meetings the 
overwhelming method of choice. There had been some innovations in Liverpool, 
including consultation events in public areas with high footfall such as shopping 
centres and the use of participatory budgeting, with each ward allocated £10,000 to 
spend on activities or projects chosen by residents, but there remained significant 
room for greater experimentation with models such as e-governance, dramatic 
exploration and engagement with specific groups (such as young people or ethnic 
minorities), to reach out to those who are not always heard. In all three of the case 
study areas, residents‟ organisations and meetings tended to be attended by only a 
small number of highly engaged and active residents. In Delfshaven, for example, 
elderly residents were said to have given associations a „stuffy‟ image, which had 
discouraged younger people and minority ethnic communities from engaging. In 
Roubaix there were also reports of „class confrontation‟ between more mobilised and 
well-resourced residents and other, less well-off sections of the community. The 
perceived dominance of some more middle class associations within the 
Neighbourhood Council had led Roubaix to require minimum quotas for different 
types of members. In the city council, an official claimed that in the Neighbourhood 
„Ouest‟ (West) there is no room for the „little people‟. Overall, the evidence suggests 
that there is room for improvement, particularly in terms of accountability to 
residents‟ inputs and feedback, and to the diversity of the community. It is not easy to 
mobilise a Big Society on a consistent basis through representative or consultative 
structures. 
 
However, weaknesses in relation to “the civic” partly reflected the need for 
neighbourhood working to meet other objectives. There were inherent tensions 
between delivering social, economic and/or political rationales and the civic rationale. 
A key issue was scale, or „territorial coherence‟. The main state-led vehicles – District 
Committees, Neighbourhood Councils and City-Districts – all covered areas identified 
and defined by their respective city councils. These areas contained a number of much 
smaller areas that residents identified more strongly with – those which, in reality, 
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residents considered their „neighbourhoods‟. Notably, the resident-led Neighbourhood 
Committees in Roubaix aligned closely to Neighbourhood West‟s traditional 
industrial neighbourhoods. In Roubaix and Liverpool this had been countered 
somewhat by organising resident engagement at a sub-district, neighbourhood level 
(with the interaction of Neighbourhood Councils and the smaller scale, resident-led 
Neighbourhood Committees in Roubaix considered particularly successful), although 
equally this also added to the complexity of local governance, which can be 
problematic for citizen engagement and also democratic renewal.  
 
Neighbourhood structures and the community had also had to contend with the reality 
of changing political agendas (and short-termism) at the city level, as described by one 
neighbourhood stakeholder from Delfshaven in Rotterdam:  
„I‟ve been explaining this now to the local government for the 3rd time 
in 3 years…there is no consistency in people, ideas, no awareness of 
local networks, just no consistency at all. Each government seems to 
want to start all over again. I have sincere doubts about any 
effectiveness or efficiency in local policies and implementation plans‟.  
Another key issue was accountability. Civic renewal through direct citizen 
participation sat uneasily with more formal representative democratic processes 
designed to revitalise local democracy and local political leadership, or partnership 
models where diverse service providers worked together to meet citizens‟ needs. This 
generated frustrations on both sides. Tensions existed between politicians and 
residents‟ bodies that were not anticipated or well managed. In Roubaix, some 
Neighbourhood Mayors were reported to have not properly performed their role, with 
attempts to dominate proceedings leading to disillusionment and disengagement 
among stakeholders. There were also tensions between the existing Neighbourhood 
Committees and the Neighbourhood Councils created by the Loi Vaillant in 2003. The 
Committees quickly felt threatened and de-legitimised by these new governance 
bodies, which covered a larger area and had significantly higher budgets, and there 
have since been several debates over roles and legitimacy between the two bodies. 
Within Neighbourhood West, one Neighbourhood Committee tended to have a 
cooperative approach with the Neighbourhood Council, while the other admitted to be 
constantly in conflict with the Neighbourhood Council: „We attack and threaten the 
Council, we even go to court. We work together for the sake of residents‟. The city 
council seemed to have been ill-prepared for managing these tensions, saying that: 
„nobody had imagined that the existence of Neighbourhood Committees and Councils 
would imply a shift in the decision making process. We have a direct suffrage and 
elected representatives have the right to the take decisions. We ask residents to give 
their opinion and co-produce in some cases’.  
 
In Alt Valley also the emphasis on local political leadership seemed to work at odds 
with a „bottom up‟ approach. For example the „Your Community Matters‟ events were 
commissioned by the City Council, and its elected members had a strong influence 
over the format and content of events. The City Council‟s view that ward councillors 
should act as community champions was challenged by voluntary sector 
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representatives, some of whom felt that low voter turnouts, a lack of alternative 
candidates in some areas and the fact that not all councillors worked or lived in the 
communities they represented weakened their legitimacy. Meetings provided 
opportunities for members of the public to engage with service providers in person, 
provide information about neighbourhood issues, and identify their own priorities for 
action. However communication of these issues upwards was dependent upon 
individual service providers and Councillors and them acting effectively as 
„champions‟. 
 
5.  Discussion and Conclusions: Delivering the Big Society - ‘Popular’ 
and ‘Invited’ Neighbourhood Spaces 
The policy pronouncements of the new Government around the twin flagship aims of 
the „Big Society‟ and localism seem to be strongly supportive of the various rationales 
for neighbourhood working aiming to ensure responsiveness, to offer direct, local 
support to nascent community activity, and to coordinate community-run services. On 
this basis, one might expect to see a period of expansion and perhaps embedding of 
neighbourhood working activities and structures in the months ahead.  
 
Yet the evidence presented in our case studies questions and challenges the 
effectiveness of neighbourhood structures in achieving the „civic‟ objectives 
associated with the Big Society. This evidence supports the findings of previous 
research (for example, Durose and Richardson, 2009) that has indicated that in 
practice the civic is neglected in neighbourhood working, overwhelmed by the 
demands of the other rationales. This evidence points to an unacknowledged tension 
within current UK government policy. Devolution to and within local authorities (i.e. 
to local rather than central authorities) does not necessarily result in, and can thwart, 
community activism and empowerment (giving power to local communities rather 
than local authorities).  
 
Nonetheless, there were also examples within the case studies of neighbourhood 
initiatives which had successfully promoted community involvement. Despite the 
difficulties Roubaix‟s Neighbourhood Committees and associated Residents‟ 
Participation Fund, the Dutch Neighbourhood and Resident Budgets, and 
Opzoomeren‟s neighbourhood workers all did promote active community 
involvement. In the latter case, state support had helped to build on and extend 
community action, making the Big Society bigger. The partial incorporation of civic 
action in these examples helped the community‟s voice to be heard when major 
decisions were being taken which affected their neighbourhood, ensured that national 
funding for empowerment reached residents and community groups, and provided 
arenas for diverse and competing interests to be reconciled or moderated. 
 
In thinking through how to reconcile the existing structures for neighbourhood 
working with the aspiration of the „Big Society‟, Lowndes and Sullivan (2008) 
provide another useful heuristic for understanding neighbourhood working in 
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differentiating between „invited‟ and „popular‟ spaces. „Invited‟ spaces are structures 
and vehicles for neighbourhood working created by the states whereas „popular‟ 
spaces are created outside of conventional political systems and structures. It follows 
that „invited‟ spaces may be less effective in delivering „civic‟ objectives as they are 
driven „top down‟ whereas popular spaces are developed by citizens „bottom up‟.  
 
The central-local relations in each of three main governance models identified in the 
case studies are clear examples of „invited‟ spaces: the District Committees and their 
associated thematic partnerships, established by Liverpool City Council; the 
Neighbourhood Councils, required by national law and defined by Roubaix City 
Council, and of course the Dutch City-Districts, which in themselves constitute an 
additional tier of local government. The Opzoomeren and the Roubaix Neighbourhood 
Committees are examples of popular spaces. The evidence suggests that invited spaces 
set up to manage services and deliver economies of scale may well be predisposed 
towards engaging with larger numbers of residents to achieve purely informative and 
consultative goals. They may also be considered insufficiently independent by 
community parties, particularly private companies and residents with which they may 
be seeking to engage, leading to limited involvement. Some level of independence and 
autonomy from any one public sector agency/service provider is required to best 
deliver the civic rationale.  
 
The Coalition Government‟s aspirations for the „Big Society‟ whilst having 
neighbourhood working at their core, seem to imply a necessary shift in the type of 
neighbourhood structures and arrangements towards „popular‟ spaces. Whilst popular 
spaces on the other hand may offer the best potential for delivering civic renewal they 
may be insufficiently strategic (in focus and scale) to help deliver wider social and 
economic objectives and they may lack legitimacy in the eyes of local government. 
Increased community control can also bring with it an increased risk that decisions 
and services will become mismanaged or politicised, and that conflicts will occur. It is 
said that community engagement is more likely to be effective in relatively 
homogenous communities with shared values and beliefs, and a strong sense of 
belonging and understanding built up over time (Woodin et al 2010). Where groups 
with different interests are not prepared to compromise, there is the potential for 
increased tension between ethnic and social groups (James, 2006, Young Foundation, 
2005). The proliferation of small community groups running public services can 
enable consumer choice and holistic localised delivery. However, such organisations 
and partnerships are often, by design, outside formal democratic control. Their 
proliferation can work against formal democratic accountability and the ability of 
elected organisations to respond to community concerns. There also remains a 
substantive question about the interest and appetite for the „Big Society‟ from 
communities and citizens. We are by no means certain either that proliferation will 
occur or that successful modes of neighbourhood working, effectively achieving the 
stated civic objectives, will arise from the Coalition‟s approach.  
 
Indeed, other evidence has shown that, particularly for disadvantaged areas, the level 
and quality of „popular‟ civic action is enhanced by the presence of „invited‟ 
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structures of neighbourhood working. The Local Research Project (CLG, 2010a) 
investigated the impact of the National Strategy for Neighbourhood Renewal across 
twenty-one of the most deprived neighbourhoods in England. It found that deprived 
neighbourhoods with effective systems of neighbourhood working were more likely to 
have resident participation in decision making and service delivery, and as a 
consequence more likely to have benefited from improved and often innovative 
services and projects nested within their neighbourhoods. Examples include Bolton‟s 
Neighbourhood Management Pathfinder and its recruitment of younger and older 
volunteers to explore the service needs of local residents, as well as the employment 
of local people to help fellow residents access jobs; Hastings‟ Community Forums and 
their role in organising resident-led neighbourhood festivals to boost community 
cohesion and spirit; Sheffield‟s development trusts, instrumental in involving local 
people in small-scale environmental projects and accessing contracts to deliver public 
services; and Knowsley Housing Trust‟s (KHT‟s) engagement with local residents to 
inform the remodelling of one of their major housing estates. Within those 
neighbourhoods where effective „invited‟ neighbourhood working structures or 
processes were absent, there were fewer opportunities for residents to engage in civic 
and social action and perceptions of place and local services tended to be more 
negative.  
 
There is an unresolved contradiction in UK government policy which arises here. The 
Big Society is posed as a liberating alternative to big government, while in fact in 
some circumstances promoting the Big Society may require an expansion of local 
government support structures. Cox and Schmuecker (2010) have also shown that 
even when established, community and social enterprises tend to rely heavily on 
government grant and support. In other words, civic engagement can be (and perhaps 
must be) facilitated and provided ongoing support by local governmental structures if 
it is to thrive.  
 
The approach to neighbourhood working in the Big Society seems to be explicitly 
moving away from targeted interventions in the most deprived neighbourhoods, 
towards the neighbourhood as a space for civic activity, not only having a say in 
decision making and service design, but taking an active role in delivering those 
services. Some communities are more ready for Big Society versions of 
neighbourhood working than others. Some will not ever have the resources or capacity 
to sustain community-run activities and services, and, on the strength of the evidence 
above, can significantly benefit from investment in capacity-building or catalytic 
structures such as neighbourhood forums, partnerships, or management organisations, 
be they an arm of the state or independent civic body, such as a development trust. 
The move to the „Big Society‟ also comes at a time when the funds to support capacity 
building and neighbourhood management and support workers (for example, the 
Working Neighbourhoods Fund) are being withdrawn as the government attempts to 
reduce the country‟s deficit through public spending cuts. A further difficulty is that 
civic participation is almost inevitably stimulated by specific social needs or local 
issues: the desire to provide a better children‟s playground or somewhere for young 
people to hang out, or to make streets safer or prevent demolition of a valued 
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community building, for example. The availability of public funds to apply for is a 
key driver of civic activity, as evidenced by both the Local Research Project and the 
European case studies, suggesting that participation may be more difficult to stimulate 
during a period of public spending restraint. For the coalition, in one sense 
neighbourhood working is an integral part of a Big Society, but in another it 
represents unnecessary and/or unaffordable aspects of big government. There is an 
urgent need to work out what kind of structures are needed to support greater civic 
participation, and where the money is going to come from.  
 
Given these contradictions and difficulties, how should neighbourhood working move 
forward in the „Big Society‟? Our analysis has pointed to the need for neighbourhood 
working to be both „invited‟ and „popular‟. Without local government buy-in and 
support, the sustainability of neighbourhood structures is questionable, with some 
organisations in England effectively left to wither on the vine following the ending of 
national funding. Thus popular spaces need to remain popular, but may also need 
support and recognition in order to remain sustainable. There is an important role for 
city-level government in framing and „inviting‟ or enabling successful models of 
neighbourhood working as a strategic partner, as well as transferring practice across 
neighbourhoods.  
 
The current localism agenda provides local authorities and citizens with an 
opportunity to re-think the relationships between civic action and political 
representation, but they do not offer the answers. Under an agenda of decentralisation, 
the establishment of neighbourhood working arrangements may be left to the local 
level, and local authorities may choose to have no or limited civic apparatus. Indeed, 
following the recent financial settlement for local government, many authorities may 
see civic apparatus as a peripheral luxury. Such an attitude to the wider, more strategic 
role which local government has to play in delivering civic objectives would be both 
short-termist and self-defeating. Whilst the limitations of current practice within many 
local authorities are clear (Durose and Richardson, 2009), local authorities need to 
grasp the opportunity to re-imagine the strategic role they have to play in ensuring 
innovation in service delivery and the well-being of the communities they serve.  
 
Perhaps the most important conclusion to be drawn from the case studies is that that 
local government needs to acknowledge that there is no one harmonious or single 
solution to the multiple objectives of renewed local democracy, civic empowerment, 
and better and more efficient public services. Neighbourhood working structures and 
processes may be established by a wide range of bodies, from city governments 
through to housing providers, established regeneration organisations and residents‟ 
groups. The challenge faced by local government is to develop a strategic „place 
shaping‟ role without being threatened by such potential allies, but rather learning 
from them to reconstitute „invited‟ spaces and facilitate „popular‟ spaces for 
neighbourhood working.  
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Appendix 1: City and Neighbourhood Backgrounds 
City Backgrounds 
Post-industrial cities 
All three cities have been shaped by their industrial heritage, experiencing socio-
economic decline in the second half of the 20
th
 century. All three have made 
significant efforts on urban revitalisation in the last 30 years, with some signs of 
recovery. 
 
Liverpool is a former industrial and port city in England‟s North West region. It 
experienced rapid economic and social decline during the 1980s and 1990s following 
the decline of its traditional manufacturing industries. Since the mid-1990s there have 
been efforts to create an urban renaissance, with redevelopment of its docklands area 
as a regional hub for culture, retail and leisure. The city has been a recipient of 
mulitple European and national government regeneration schemes. Rising prosperity 
in Liverpool‟s inner-city district has not been matched by conditions in many outer 
urban areas, where worklessness and social deprivation remain pervasive.  
 
At the start of the First World War, Roubaix in northern France was the second region 
for the textile industry after Lancaster in the UK. The decline of its competitive 
positive in the textile markets created social and economic difficulties for Roubaix. In 
1983, the Centrists came to power with the aim to give a new image to the city with 
extensive investment in the city centre. A master plan (Schema Directeur) for the 
wider metropolitan area (the Lille Metropole) was launched in the early 1990s 
following the principles of the „renewed city‟ (Ville Renouvelée)6, and including the 
investments in the centre of Roubaix.  
 
Like Liverpool, Rotterdam is a port city in the west of the country which still faces 
some serious structural problems and pressing urban challenges. The Netherlands 
second largest city has historically been a working class city with jobs in the port and 
related industries such as petrochemicals, warehousing, logistics and wholesale. In the 
1950s the city was one of the world largest ports, attracting migrant labour within the 
Netherlands, and in the 1970s, large numbers of „guest labourers‟ from Turkey and 
Morocco. Rotterdam was one of the nine Dutch cities that received European 
Objective 2 funds. Investment programmes are underway to increase economic 
development, educational attainment, community safety, employment levels, average 
incomes, and Rotterdammers who speak the Dutch language. 
 
History of left-wing politics 
Common to all three is a history of leftist politics and militancy. For example, the 
early 1980s saw the dominant political party in Liverpool - the Labour Party - 
dominated by a socialist grouping, the Militant Tendency, later to become 
                                              
6  The‟Ville renouvelée‟ refers to principles developed in the 1980s aiming at planning cities in 
a sustainable way through containing urban sprawl and prioritising the densification of cities 
and‟soft‟ mobility.  
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independent of the Labour party and form the Socialist Party. Roubaix has been 
described as a „Mecca for Socialism‟. Socialists governed the city almost continually 
from 1892 until 1983. A successful coexistence between a strong leftist political 
movement and the conservative and catholic „Patronat‟ (employers) is very specific to 
Roubaix. Until the end of the 1990s, Rotterdam was dominated by the Labour Party 
(PvdA), extremely statist and protective of labour. However, in 2001 the more 
populist Liveable Rotterdam party rose to prominence, partly on a platform of tackling 
problems associated with immigration, to become the single biggest party in the city 
until 2010. 
 
Neighbourhood Backgrounds 
All three neighbourhoods are areas of concentrated deprivation. Alt Valley is one of 
five Neighbourhood Management Areas (NMAs) created by Liverpool City Council 
in 2007. With a population of around 90,000, it made up of six electoral wards, which 
then have sub-neighbourhoods within them. Alt Valley has one of Liverpool‟s largest 
employment and industrial zones located along a Strategic Investment Area, which 
has been prioritised for growth. However, the neighbourhood exhibits high levels of 
deprivation in some areas, with residents having relatively low skills and incomes and 
their children performing poorly at school; there are also above average levels of 
unoccupied housing and high levels of crime and anti-social behaviour. It has been 
allocated central government funding based on its deprivation rankings.  
 
Neighbourhood West (Quartier Ouest), Roubiax, is one of five neighbourhoods of 
Roubaix, with around 15,000 inhabitants from a population of around 100,000 in 
Roubiax
7
. These neighbourhoods were created in the late 1990s through the merging 
of 15 sub-neighbourhoods, which used to be the historical industrial cores of the city 
to which residents still strongly identify. Neighbourhood West contains two sub-
neighbourhoods: Fresnoy-Mackellerie and Epeule Trichon. Many socio-economic 
indicators for neighbourhood West show high levels of deprivation compared to 
Roubaix and the Lille Metropolitan area. 
 
Delfshaven is one of Rotterdam‟s 13 city districts, and has around 70,000 inhabitants 
from a population of around 590,000 in Rotterdam. There are seven „sub-
neighbourhoods‟ in Delfshaven. Delfshaven lags behind Rotterdam and also most 
urban areas in the Netherlands as a whole, scoring below average on a range of socio-
economic indicators. It has been targeted by various initiatives (EU, national, and 
local) since 1994 for urban regeneration. 
 
 
 
 
                                              
7  Figure from 1999 data. Data not available between 2000 and 2009 (to be issued in 2010). 
Roubaix‟s population was 97,952 in 2006. 
